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Abstract
Population learning in dynamic economies has been traditionally studied in over-
simpliﬁed settings where payoﬀ landscapes are very smooth. Indeed, in these models,
all agents play the same bilateral stage-game against any opponent and stage-game
payoﬀsr e ﬂect very simple strategic situations (e.g. coordination). In this paper, we
address a preliminary investigation of dynamic population games over ‘rugged’ land-
scapes, where agents face a strong uncertainty about expected payoﬀs from bilateral
interactions. We propose a simple model where individual payoﬀs from playing a
binary action against everyone else are distributed as a i.i.d. U[0,1] r.v.. We call this
setting a ‘random population game’ and we study population adaptation over time
when agents can update both actions and partners using deterministic, myopic, best
reply rules. We assume that agents evaluate payoﬀs associated to networks where an
agent is not linked with everyone else by using simple rules (i.e. statistics) computed
on the distributions of payoﬀs associated to all possible action combinations per-
formed by agents outside the interaction set. We investigate the long-run properties
of the system by means of computer simulations. We show that: (i) allowing for en-
dogenous networks implies higher average payoﬀ as compared to “frozen” networks;
(ii) the statistics employed to evaluate payoﬀs strongly aﬀect the eﬃciency of the
system, i.e. convergence to a unique (multiple) steady-state(s) or not; (iii) for some
class of statistics (e.g. MIN or MAX), the likelihood of eﬃcient population learn-
ing strongly depends on whether agents are change-averse or not in discriminating
between options delivering the same expected payoﬀ.
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11 Introduction
The last decade has witnessed the emergence of a large class of models aiming at un-
derstanding the evolution of behaviors in a population of interacting economic actors (cf.
e.g. Kirman (1997) and Fagiolo (1998)). A typical exercise consists in modelling a decen-
tralized economy as composed of many entities (consumers, ﬁrms, etc.) who repeatedly
interact over time. Interactions are generated by some form of externalities because the de-
cision problem of any single agent takes as parameters the behaviors of other agents in the
population (see Blume & Durlauf (2001)). These parameters might be interpreted as indi-
vidual expectations. If the latter are modelled as myopic (or adaptive), individual decision
problems depend on past (observed) behaviors of others actors in the system. Therefore,
any aggregate measure of the behavior of the system (e.g. some statistics computed on
individual choices) will follow a Markovian process (cf. Brock & Durlauf (2001)).
Within this framework, much eﬀort has been devoted to the study of repeated, dy-
namic, population games, cf. Blume (1993). A dynamic population game is an interaction-
based description of a decentralized economy where agents play non-cooperative, simple
games against other agents in the population. Interactions (and externalities) are modelled
through payoﬀ matrices describing the outcome of bilateral games. Agents hold myopic
or adaptive expectations about the behavior of their opponents in the games and employ
simple (boundedly rational) decision rules to choose the strategy to perform. Examples
range from deterministic and myopic best-response to stochastic rules (e.g. log-linear rule,
best-reply with noise, etc.). A key assumption is that behaviors are reversible. Therefore,
agents are allowed, from time to time, to revise their current choice on the basis of the
observation of actions performed by their opponents in the past.
These models allows one to address three related questions: (i) Under which conditions
the system converges to some equilibria (either as a steady-state or as some statistical
regularity) in the long-run? (ii) Which eﬃciency properties do long-run aggregate outcomes
2possess?1 And: (iii) To what extent direct interactions, as well as individual rationality,
aﬀect population dynamics and long-run properties?
In this perspective, two broad classes of models might be singled out. First, many
scholars have been attempting to study population games where the interaction structure
(i.e. the map that deﬁnes who plays the game with whom at each point in time) is not
allowed to evolve through time. Here, the basic exercise involves assessing how diﬀerent
interaction structures are able to aﬀect the long-run behavior of the system. Interaction
structures might range from global ones (i.e. each agent has a positive probability of
playing the game with any other agent in the population) to local ones (i.e. each agent
always plays the game with her ‘nearest neighbors’). In the latter case, players are placed
in some metric space (e.g. regular lattices) and only interact with agents located in their
neighborhood. The spatial dimension of the economy is taken to reﬂect some underlying
socio-economic dissimilarity, deﬁned in a space of unobserved variables that are assumed
to change very slowly as compared to the pace at which individual actions are allowed to
be revised. In this case, the assumption of static interaction structure is justiﬁed because
the frequency at which agents are allowed to update their partners in the game is so small
that this additional revision process would not aﬀect the properties of the one governing
strategy updating2.
Second, a complementary and more recent line of research has originated from the
observation that, whenever the frequency at which agents are allowed to revise the choice
about their interacting partners is at least comparable to that at which they update their
strategy in the game, it becomes crucial to study in a co-evolutionary manner the interplay
between the two revision processes (cf. Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2001), Jackson & Watts
(2000), Droste, Gilles & Johnson (2000) and Fagiolo (2001)).
1For instance, in population games where all agents play a coordination game, one is often interested
in studying whether the system converges to a conﬁguration where all agents play the Pareto-eﬃcient Nash
equilibrium vs. a risk-dominant one, cf. Kandori, Mailath & Rob (1993).
2Kandori et al. (1993), Young (1996) and Young (1998) study dynamic population games with static
interaction structures where players employ stochastic decision rules. On the contrary, spatial population
games with local and static interaction structures are investigated in Ellison (1993), Young (1998), Nowak,
Bonnhoefer & May (1994) and Nowak et al. (1994).
3Models which adopt the latter perspective describe dynamic settings where agents have
the option of repeatedly updating (whether simultaneously or not) both the strategy to
be played in the game against their current partners and the set of partners in the game3.
Network updating becomes endogenous and often occurs on the basis of expected payoﬀsi n
diﬀerent alternative networks. Once again, a crucial assumption concerns whether agents
are able to freely select any other agent in the population (i.e. a sort of global matching
process) or not (e.g. they can only locally adapt the set of their interacting partners in
some space endowed with a metrics deﬁned on the basis of some underlying, slow-moving,
variables).
Notwithstanding all that, the entire body of models studying dynamic, repeated, pop-
ulation games, while concentrating its attention almost exclusively on the roles played by
the amount of rationality to be imputed to economic agents and the structure of (either
static or endogenous) interactions, has paid virtually no attention in exploring economies
where the payoﬀ landscape generated by individual stage-games played by the agents is not
‘smooth’. In fact, the literature has extensively studied population games where bilateral
stage-game payoﬀsr e ﬂect very simple, strategic situations (e.g. coordination, ‘prisoner
dilemma’, ‘hawk-dove’, etc.) which are directly interpretable and, so to speak, very easy
to learn both by individuals and by the population. In all these settings, individual payoﬀs
are common knowledge (there is no uncertainty whatsoever about payoﬀs) and each agent
plays the same game against any other agent in the population. Moreover, the learning
process (albeit rudimentary) acts at a population-level on smooth landscapes where the
payoﬀ of any single agent depends on some average levels of the behaviors of players be-
longing to her interacting set. For instance, in population coordination games, individual
payoﬀs are a linear function of the number (or the frequency) of coordinated agents in the
network. This implies that individual payoﬀs are invariant to permutations which preserve
the frequency of agents currently playing a given strategy in the network. As a result, the
3See also Goyal & Janssen (1997), Skyrms & Pemantle (2000) and Mailath, Samuelson & Shaked
(2000). Dynamic models of non-cooperative network formation only (i.e. without simultaneous choice of
a strategic variable) are studied in Bala & Goyal (2000), Watts (2001) and Jackson & Watts (2002).
4payoﬀ landscape is relatively smooth because it does not change very much across conﬁg-
urations that are characterized by the same distribution of local frequencies (e.g. number
of agents playing coordinated actions across diﬀerent networks).
On the contrary, in many real-world settings agents face a strong uncertainty about
‘which game to play with whom’ in any time period and, consequently, about the payoﬀ
that they might expect from any bilateral interaction. If the ‘type’ of each prospective
opponent is (at least at the beginning of the process) unknown and agents are allowed to
c h a n g et h eg a m et h e yp l a yb o t ho v e rt i m ea n da c r o s sd i ﬀerent meetings, the metaphor of a
smooth payoﬀ landscape with homogenous stage-game payoﬀ matrices might be misleading
(for a quite similar perspective cf. Bednar & Page (2002), Calvert & Johnson (1997) and
Taylor (1987)). Indeed, in such situations, one typically observes strong heterogeneity
of stage-game payoﬀs matrices and, in turn, a high variability of payoﬀs experienced by
agents after each bilateral game. More speciﬁcally, expected (and realized) payoﬀso fe a c h
economic agent might be extremely sensitive to small changes in the conﬁguration of actions
currently performed by actors in her network.
In this paper, we propose a preliminary model that attempts to capture population
game settings where agents face high uncertainty about expected payoﬀs from bilateral
interactions. We argue that, at least as a ﬁrst approximation, individual payoﬀ from
playing a certain strategy (given the current conﬁguration of population choices) may be
modelled as being i.i.d. random variables. In particular, we assume that if an agent
interacts with everyone else in the population, the payoﬀ she receives (conditional to any
possible combination of actions performed by the others) is distributed as a uniform (i.i.d.)
random variable with support [0,1]. We call this setting a ‘random population game’.
We choose not to model the process through which agents learn e.g. how to ‘play the
right game’, as they discover the ‘types’ of their opponents (see Bednar & Page (2002)
for an alternative approach based on ‘individual learning’). On the contrary, we study
the process through which the population adapts over time, when agents are allowed to
both adjust their actions and their network (i.e. their opponents in the game). More
5speciﬁcally, we assume that from time to time agents might either delete single links that
they currently maintain active with other agents or add single, new links with currently
disconnected agents4. We assume that agents hold myopic expectations (i.e. based on
last-period observation) and employ deterministic best reply rules (i.e. maximization of
expected payoﬀs) to choose the strategy to play and whether adding or deleting links.
Furthermore, we assume that maintaining a link is costless and that both link addition
and link deletion require mutual consent. Finally, we allow payoﬀ tie-breaking rules to
account either for change-adverse players (who always stick to current choice when a tie
occurs) or change-lover players (who always accept to change even if their payoﬀ is the
same).
In order to compute expected payoﬀs associated to local networks implying a number of
links smaller than the maximum one (i.e. a player not interacting with all the others), we
suppose that players use simple statistics computed on the distribution of payoﬀsa s s o c i -
ated to all possible combinations of actions performed by agents outside her local network.
In particular, we will study four simple statistics: average of such payoﬀs (MEAN hence-
forth), their maximum value (MAX), their minimum value (MIN) and a random draw
thereof (RND). These rules (or criteria) might be interpreted as heuristics employed by
individuals to form (myopic) expectations (or more generally to learn or forecast) on the
payoﬀ associated to radically new environments (i.e. when the network is diﬀerent from
the complete one). Along the same lines, a rule may be understood as the way agents cope
with the uncertainty of the system: using a given rule might then represent the way agents
synthesize the information provided by the distribution of payoﬀsa s s o c i a t e dt ot h ec o m -
plete network. For example, if an agent uses a MIN rule to compute the expected payoﬀ
of the network associated to a link deletion, she might be labelled as being ‘conservative’
or ‘pessimistic’ (and vice versa if she employs the MAX rule).
In turn, the above criteria have a direct interpretation in terms of the trade-oﬀ be-
4Network updating rules is quite similar to that in employed in Jackson (2001), Watts (2001)a n d
Jackson & Watts (2000). Unlike these models, however, we impose mutual consent in both link addition
and deletion.
6tween mean and spread of experienced payoﬀs. Since the cardinality of the set of payoﬀs
associated to all possible choices of agents outside the network increases as the number
of her links decreases, the distribution of the expected payoﬀs of an agent using e.g. a
MIN criterion becomes more concentrated around a decreasing mean as the agent shrinks
her network. Conversely, expected payoﬀs of an agent using e.g. a MAX criterion become
more concentrated around an increasing mean as she keeps deleting links. Therefore, diﬀer-
ent criteria will have non trivial consequences on individual (and population-wide) ﬁtness
landscapes.
We study the long-run behavior of the model in diﬀerent setups. First, as a bench-
mark exercise, we explore the economy where networks are exogenously given and time-
invariant5. Our original contribution here is to study what happens to aggregate statistics
(average payoﬀs, etc.) when one compares systems characterized by an increasing average
number of links (i.e. from very disconnected and sparse networks toward complete, fully-
connectivity ones) and diﬀerent payoﬀ criteria (MIN, MAX, etc.). Computer simulations
show that if the average number of links is suﬃciently large, then no steady-state is ever
reached. All populations continue to explore the landscape and serial correlation between
average payoﬀs is not statistically diﬀerent from zero. The long-run relationship between
the distribution of individual payoﬀs and number of links held by agents is driven (for any
payoﬀ rule) by the trade-oﬀ between average and spread induced by any chosen criterion.
Since the set of payoﬀs associated to all possible choices of agents outside the network
becomes larger as the number of links an agent maintains decreases, then agents holding a
lower (higher) number of links get a payoﬀ with mean 0.5 and highly concentrated (highly
dispersed).
Second, we explore random population games with endogenous networks. We run
Montecarlo exercises to investigate the eﬀect of initial conditions (i.e. initial network
and strategy conﬁgurations), payoﬀ criteria and tie-breaking rules on long-run average
5In this case, the model has a structure quite similar (but also with some substantial diﬀerences, see
below) to that of Kauﬀman’s NK class of formalizations (see Kauﬀman (1993)).
7outcomes. We show that both the long-run behavior of the system (e.g. convergence
to steady-states) and its short-run dynamic properties are strongly aﬀected by: (i) the
payoﬀ rule employed; (ii) whether players are change-adverse or not. We ﬁnd that if
agents use the MEAN rule, then, irrespective of the change-aversion regime, the system
displays multiplicity of steady-states. Populations always climb local optima by ﬁrst using
action- and network-updating together and then network-updating only. Climbing occurs
through successful adaptation and generates long-run positive correlation between number
of links and average payoﬀs. With MIN or MAX rules, the long-run behavior of the system
is instead aﬀected by whether players are change-adverse. If they are, and employ the
MIN rule, then the network converges to a steady-state where all agents are (almost) fully
connected but strategies are not, so that average payoﬀs oscillate. If agents employ the
MAX rule then the system displays many steady-states (in both networks and actions)
characterized by few links and diﬀerent levels of average payoﬀ. Finally, if agents are
change-lovers, then the population can explore a larger portion of the landscape. Therefore,
with agents using the MIN rule, the network will converges to the complete one, but from
then on exploration on strategies will go on forever. If they employ the MAX rule, then
the system will display a unique optimum. All populations converge to the same payoﬀ
distribution but neutral NU will continue forever (without aﬀecting realized payoﬀs).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we brieﬂy discuss some
relevant pieces of literature and we introduce informally the model presented in Section 3.
An overview of simulation results is contained in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes
discussing extensions of the model and future research.
82 Population Games, Payoﬀs and Endogenous Net-
works
In the last years, a large body of literature has been extensively studying the outcome of
decentralized decisions undertaken by large populations of boundedly rational agents who
repeatedly and directly interact over time. Within this large class of formal models, many
authors have been focusing on dynamic population games, i.e. games played over time by
large populations boundedly rational players. In what follows, we will ﬁrst brieﬂys u r v e y
this vast literature. Next, we will discuss some motivations underlying the model which
we will informally describe at the end of this Section.
2.1 Dynamic Population Games: A Brief Survey
The standard framework common to dynamic population games consists of a set of N
individuals who play games in discrete time. In any time period t ≥ 1, each individual
i plays a strategy (or strategy) st
i ∈ S. Assume for the sake of simplicity that S =
{−1,+1} and that whenever two agents (say i and j) meet, they play a bilateral game










with a,b,c ∈ R.
In this setup, all agents play the same game, they know that also the others will do the
same and G is common knowledge. Finally, assume that at each point in time, any agent
i only meets agents j belonging to the set V t
i ⊆ I (i.e. plays bilateral games deﬁned by
G against all and only agents in V t
i ). The collection (V t
i )i∈I is called (time t) interaction
structure. The dynamics is typically deﬁned as follows. At any t,a na g e n t( s a yi)i s
chosen at random from I6 to revise her current state (i.e. st
i,o rV t
i ,o rb o t h ) . A g e n ti
6This scheme is known as asynchronous updating. The consequences of assuming synchronous updating
9then forms myopic expectations about her next-period payoﬀ under diﬀerent alternatives
(e.g. actions and/or interaction structures) and employs a decision rule to choose her




i , or both). Decision rules typically diﬀer as to
whether they introduce some idiosyncractic noise (interpreted either as the possibility of
experimentation or mistakes) or not. In the latter case, the rule is deterministic and is
usually based on local best-reply dynamics. For instance, if V t
i are exogenously given and
do not change over time, agents will pick their next-period strategy by employing the rule:
s
t+1







where total individual payoﬀst oi from interacting with agents in the network - i.e.
w(s;st
j,j∈ V t
i ) -a r es i m p l yd e ﬁned as the sum (or the average) of all payoﬀs from bilateral
games. Introducing a stochastic term might then reverse, with some small probability,
the decision that maximizes local payoﬀs. The size of a ‘mistake’ may in turn be either
constant as the relative frequencies of players choosing +1 or −1 in each V t
i change (cf.
noisy best-reply rules used in Ellison (1993)) or state-dependent (e.g. the log-linear rule,
where the probability of choosing against the majority becomes very small - although not
null - as the “size of the majority” gets larger, cf. Brock & Durlauf (2001) and Blume
(1993)).
A dynamic population game is therefore completely deﬁned once one speciﬁes: (i) the
payoﬀsi nt h em a t r i xG; (ii) the interaction structure in place at each given point in time
(or the rule that governs how the interaction structure changes over time).
With some minor exceptions7, the vast majority of models have been focusing on either
coordination or prisoner dilemma games with static (either global or local) interaction
structures (i.e. games where V t
i = Vi,a l lt ≥ 1). More recently, however, a few contribu-
schemes (i.e. where agents are allowed perform a parallel updating) or incentive-based updating schemes
(where which agent is allowed to revise her choice depends on the state of the system) are studied in Page
(1997).
7Cf. for instance Nowak & May (1993), Nowak et al. (1994) and Herz (1994). See also Jackson &
Watts (2000) in the context of endogenous networks.
10tions have pointed out that endogenous network dynamics may play a non-trivial role in
shaping long-run equilibrium patterns and their eﬃciency properties8.
For example, in the context of coordination games, ‘static interactions’ literature has
been able to provide, in an evolutionary game perspective, a quite robust microfoundation
for equilibrium selection. For instance, whenever the underlying 2 × 2 game G has two
Nash equilibria, one of which is Pareto eﬃcient and the other is risk-dominant, Kandori
et al. (1993), Young (1996), Blume (1993) and Ellison (1993) have shown that the unique
long-run equilibrium is the risk-dominant one and that local interactions can speed up the
rate of convergence (as compared to global ones). Convergence to an eﬃcient outcome is
however the case either when non-exclusive conventions are assumed (so that agents can
pay to remain ﬂexible, i.e. choosing not to choose, cf. Goyal & Janssen (1997)); or when
players are mobile (cf. Bhaskar & Vega-Redondo (1996), Ely (1996), Oechssler (1997) and
Dieckemann (1999))9; or, more importantly, when interaction structures are fully endo-
geneized and agents are free to select as a partner any other agent in the population (cf.
Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2001)). On the contrary, when geographical barriers prevent in-
dividuals to build links with anyone else in the system, population learning converges with
a higher likelihood to risk-dominant equilibria (see Fagiolo (2001)).
Results in a similar vein have been obtained also in the context of dynamic popula-
tion games where agents play ‘prisoner dilemmas’10. No matter whether interactions are
8This class of contributions posits dynamic population games where agents, from time to time, may
have access to a network updating decision, often modeled as a best-reply rule (either deterministic or
noisy). A crucial ingredient is whether agents (when choosing their next-period network V
t+1
i )a r ea b l e
to compare expected payoﬀs from every possible network (cf. Goyal & Vega-Redondo (2001)) or they
just have the option of adding/deleting a small number of links in any choice-stage (cf. Jackson & Watts
(2000)). In this latter case, agents might be allowed to choose with a positive (although not necessarily
homogeneous) probability any other agent in the population as a new partner (cf. Droste et al. (2000))
or being constrained in choosing their network by some underlying geographical structure that restricts
networks to become neighborhoods (see Fagiolo (2001)).
9In such models, partner selection is to some extent endogeneized by assuming the existence of a ﬁxed
number of spatial locations. Players are mobile and can indirectly select their future partners by picking
the place they want to move to, on the basis of the expected net payoﬀ of each location.
10Dynamic prisoner dilemma (DPD) population games with static interaction structures have been
studied in Axelrod (1984), Herz (1994), Nowak & May (1993), Nowak et al. (1994), Oliphant (1994), Oltra
&S c h e n k( 1998) and Tieman, Houba & Van Der Laan (1998). Population games where agents play DPD
a n dc a nc h o o s en o tt oi n t e r a c tw i t ha no p p o n e n t( i . e .P Dw i t ho s t r a c i s mo rr e f u s a l )a r ei n s t e a di n v e s t i g a t e d
by Hirschleifer & Rasmusen (1989), Kitcher (19 9 3 ) ,S m u c k e r ,S t a n l e y&A s h l o c k( 1994), Stanley, Ashlock
11static (globally or locally) or endogenously evolving, iterated prisoner dilemma played by
myopic agents allows cooperation to be sustained (unlike in standard game-theoretic mod-
els). Furthermore, if players have the option to refuse interactions with other individuals
(i.e. if interaction structures become to some extent endogenous), the population tends to
cooperate more than in the case of a compulsory prisoner dilemma (cf. also Zimmermann,
Eguíluz & San Miguel (2001) and Hanaki & Peterhansl (2002)).
Despite these promising results, the literature on dynamic population games (with both
exogenous and endogenous networks) has been largely neglecting the analysis of decentral-
ized economies where agents face more complicated payoﬀ structures. Indeed, the baseline
model of a dynamic population game shares (at least) the following strong assumptions:
(a) all agents know that everyone is going to play the same game; (ii) stage-game payoﬀs
are common knowledge. This implies that the payoﬀ landscape over which population
learning takes place is quite ‘smooth’ (i.e. individual payoﬀs display a small variability as
one slightly changes the frequency of agents in the network who currently play the same
strategy). Therefore, the long-run behavior of the system is directly interpretable in terms
of bilateral games played by individuals. For example, in coordination population games,
the purported across-agent homogeneity of stage-games, as well as the nature of the game
to be played, together imply that the payoﬀ to any agent i playing, say, +1 is a linear
function of the number of agents in i’s network currently playing +1.T h u s , i n d i v i d u a l
payoﬀs are invariant to any permutation of individual choices that keeps local frequency
constant. Hence, the aggregate state of the system (e.g. all playing +1) can be interpreted
as a state of maximum coordination.
2.2 The Model: An Informal Description
In many real-world settings that we might conceive, however, the situation is quite diﬀerent.
First, an agent is not always aware in advance about which game her opponent will play
in the next meeting. Second, and partly as a consequence, stage-game payoﬀsm i g h tb e
&T e s f a t s i o n( 19 9 4 ) ,A s h l o c k ,S m u c k e r ,S t a n l e y&T e s f a t s i o n( 1996) and Hauk (1996).
12highly uncertain and, possibly, endogenously changing.
In order to model such complicated environments, one could choose to describe learning
processes from an individual or a population perspective. In the ﬁrst case, the goal would
be the investigation of the properties of adaptive individual learning about: (i) the type
of game an opponent will play tomorrow; (ii) the type of game to play against a given
opponent; and: (iii) selecting opponents that are expected to play the ‘right’ game.
In this paper, on the contrary, we focus on population learning dynamics. We model
environments where network payoﬀs are modeled so as to capture (albeit in a rudimentary
way) strong across-agent interdependencies and high sensitivity of payoﬀ landscapes (with
respect to small changes in the current conﬁguration), generated by an extreme uncertainty
about the game played by other agents in the network (and, consequently, by a large across-
time volatility of stage-game payoﬀs). More precisely, we choose to model payoﬀ landscapes
in the following way. Suppose to have a population of N =3agents (i.e. I = {1,2,3})
and that the strategy space is binary: st
i ∈ {−1,+1}. Agents live (or think to live) in a
world where everyone is in principle connected with anyone else. They expect their payoﬀ
to change in unpredictable ways whenever a small change in the current conﬁguration of
the system occurs (i.e. an agent changes either her strategy, or her partners, or both).
Consider ﬁrst the payoﬀ landscape deﬁned over the complete-network population game.
Since the payoﬀ of any agent i depends on the choices of the remaining ki =2agents, each
one faces 2N−ki+1 =4possible conﬁgurations of the world for each st
i ∈ {−1,+1} and thus
2 · 2N−ki+1 =8individual payoﬀs πi(st
1,s t
2,s t
3). In order to model the extreme underlying
uncertainty characterizing our system, we suppose that πi(st
1,s t
2,s t
3) are i.i.d., uniformly
distributed (over the unit interval), random variables11. An example of a complete payoﬀ
11If we let the system adapt using an asynchronous updating mechanism and individual best-reply deci-
sion rules, population dynamics is similar to standard adaptation over rugged ﬁtness landscapes explored
by Kauﬀman’s NK model where K = N − 1,c f .K a u ﬀman (1993). However the latter uses global payoﬀ
(ﬁtness) signals to drive adaptation: a new conﬁguration is chosen if its global ﬁt n e s si sh i g h e r .O nt h e
contrary, as we will sea below, we use local payoﬀ criteria: a link is established or deleted - and a strategy
is switched - if the payoﬀ of the agent(s) directly involved gets higher, regardless what happens to the rest
of the population. This diﬀerence has important consequences on the dynamics and in particular on the
likelihood of lock-in into local optima (see below). Finally, note that in Kauﬀman’s model the assumption
of complete connectivity is taken to reﬂect the highest possible level of ruggedness of the ﬁtness landscape




3) π1 π2 π3
(−1,−1,−1) 0.56 0.11 0.24
(−1,−1,+1) 0.77 0.54 0.17
(−1,+1,−1) 0.58 0.31 0.45
(−1,+1,+1) 0.55 0.59 0.19
(+1,−1,−1) 0.78 0.42 0.70
(+1,−1,+1) 0.32 0.54 0.25
(+1,+1,−1) 0.04 0.44 0.78
(+1,+1,+1) 0.80 0.67 0.44
Table 1. An Example of the Payoﬀ Landscape with N =3 .
Experienced payoﬀs depend on how many links an agent actually maintains with the
others. We suppose that agents can hold bilateral, costless, links with any other agents
in the population. A player may hold any number or links between 0 (isolated agents)
and N − 1 (complete connectivity). Any two agents may then hold a diﬀerent number of




3), each agent is fully characterized in each time period by her current choice st
i
and the set V t
i ⊆ I containing all her current partners (i.e. agents with whom she currently
maintain a link).
If a link between i and j exists, experienced payoﬀso fb o t hi and j are aﬀected by
whether the other chooses −1 or +1. Therefore, if agent i =1is connected with both 2 and
3 and currently plays, say, st
1 = −1,s h ew i l lf a c eap a y o ﬀ which changes as soon as either
over which population adaptation takes place.
14one of her partners switches her strategy (according to πi(st
1,s t
2,s t
3) entries in Table 1). If
an agent, conversely, is not connected with all N−1 other agents in the population, she will
use a simple statistics in order to compute expected payoﬀs from playing a given strategy.
This statistics will be computed on payoﬀs associated to all combinations of strategies
that could be played by agents outside the current network. For example, suppose that
st
1 = −1 and that the statistics employed by agent 1 is the arithmetic mean (MEAN)12.I f
1 is currently connected with 2 only, then she faces only two possible payoﬀs( a c c o r d i n g
to what her partner plays). Each payoﬀ will be then computed as the MEAN of payoﬀs





















(0.56 + 0.77 + 0.58 + 0.55)
Finally, if agent 1 decides to consider payoﬀs associated to choosing +1 and connecting















S u p p o s et h a ta tt i m et =0a random initial conﬁguration (s0
i,V0
i )N
i=1 is given. We study
a population dynamics governed by an asynchronous updating process both on strategies
and (bilaterally) on local networks. More precisely, in each t ≥ 1 a pair of agents (say h
and k)i sﬁrstly randomly drawn to attempt graph updating given current strategy conﬁg-
uration. If a link connecting h and k already exists (respectively, does not exist), the link
is tentatively removed (respectively, tentatively added). Once again, decisions are made
12Alternative choices might be: MAX, MIN or RND (i.e. picking at random one of the 2N−ki+1 payoﬀ
entries). See below.
15by deterministically best-responding to current local conﬁgurations under the proposed
alternatives. We consider two diﬀerent tie-break rules. In the ﬁrst one (henceforth, net-
work updating without neutrality), a link is removed (added) if and only if both agents
are strictly better-oﬀ under the change. This implies that agents are change-averse, be-
cause they prefer to stick to their current choices unless the alternative option is associated
to strictly larger payoﬀs for both. In the second one (henceforth, network updating with
neutrality), a change is accepted even if it implies the same payoﬀ that both agents were
experiencing before the change. This implies that agents are change-lovers, because they
prefer to change their current choices even if the new one is associated to the same payoﬀ
for both13.
Secondly, an agent (say i)i sﬁrstly drawn at random to update her current strategy st
i
given the network conﬁguration obtained in the ﬁr s ts t a g e .W ea s s u m et h a ta g e n ti will
best reply deterministically to the current local conﬁguration (i.e. she chooses the strategy
s that strictly maximizes πi(s;st
j,j∈ V t
i ), while keeping st
i if a tie occurs).
For instance, suppose that the current conﬁguration is (+1,+1,+1).A g e n t 1 is con-
nected with 2 but not with 3, while 3 is isolated. If 1 and 3 are drawn for a network update,
they will consider to add a link between them. Agent 1 will compare her current payoﬀ
1
2(0.04 + 0.80) with the payoﬀ after link addition, namely 0.80. Agent 3 will compare her
old payoﬀ 1
4(0.17 + 0.19 + 0.25 + 0.44) with the new one 1
2(0.25 + 0.44).I nt h i sc a s eb o t h
agents are better oﬀ (strictly) under the change and the link will be added. After network
updating, player 3 is connected with 1 only. If she were called to strategy updating, she
w o u l ds w i t c ht o−1 since 1
2(0.70 + 0.78) > 1
2(0.25 + 0.44).
These simple updating rules deﬁne a population dynamics whose long-run outcome
(absorbing state, cycle, etc.) and its eﬃciency properties (e.g. aggregate payoﬀ,a c r o s s -
agents distribution, etc.) might be strongly aﬀected by the choice of the criterion employed
13The term neutrality refers to the fact that under the associated tie-breaking rule agents accept neutral
changes (i.e. they add or delete a link even if they both continue to get the same payoﬀ). Notice also that
decisions are made on the basis of current payoﬀs (i.e. those observed by agents at the time of the choice).
This implies that we are assuming agents holding myopic expectations.
16to form myopic expectations over networks diﬀerent from the complete one (as well as by
whether updating rules allow for neutrality or not).
After having more formally described the model (see next Section), we will turn to
explore if (and under which conditions) this preliminary conjecture holds true by means of
extensive computer simulation exercises.
3T h e M o d e l
Consider a ﬁxed population of agents I = {1,2,...,N},N ≥ 3. Time is discrete, i.e.




i ∈ {−1,+1} is her current strategy in the population game and V t
i ⊆ I−{i} is the
set of agents of her opponents in the game (or her partners). We study a population where
the underlying links connecting agents are bilateral (i.e. i ∈ V t
j ⇔ j ∈ V t
i ) and maintaining
a link is costless for both agents. Deﬁne the size of V t
i as kt
i = |V t
i | ∈ K = {0,1,2,...,N−1}
and let V
t
i = V t
i ∪ {i} (of course, k
t
i = kt
i +1 ). The collection of sets {V t
i ,i∈ I } induces
at any t a non-directed graph Gt ∈ P(N),w h e r eP(N) is the set of all non-directed
graphs over I.W ed e n o t ew i t hij ∈ Gt t h ef a c tt h a ti nt h en e t w o r kGt agents i and j are
linked. At any given time, the system is therefore characterized by the pair {Ωt,G t},where
Ωt =( st
i)i∈I ∈ {−1,+1}N.
A “random population game” is deﬁned through the following payoﬀ structure. Let
ut
i(Ωt,G t) the payoﬀ to agent i at time t, given the current state of the system. For any
subset J ⊆ I, deﬁne a J−restricted action conﬁguration by Ωt(J)=( at


















i.e. that the payoﬀ to i at t does not change if the strategies currently performed by all
agents in I who are not partners of i (under the current graph Gt) change. To model very
uncertain environments, we suppose that if all agents were connected with anyone else (i.e.
17V
t
i = I, all i ∈ I; or, equivalently, if Gt were completely connected: kt







where X are i.i.d. random variables with p.d.f. F. In what follows, we will assume that
X ∼ U[0,1].
To form expectations about payoﬀs πt
i(Ωt(V
t





i <N , we suppose instead that agents use some “criterion” (or statistics) <. More
precisely, we posit that < is computed over individual payoﬀsa g e n ti would have earned if
individual strategies within her network V t
i were ﬁxed, while individual strategies of agents
j ∈ I − {V t
i } were allowed to freely change in {−1,+1}N−kt















i−1}. Next, deﬁne Pt
i ⊆ {−1,+1}N as
the set of all possible conﬁgurations Ωt =( st
i)i∈I ∈ {−1,+1}N for which Ωt(V
t
i) are kept
constant while we allow Ωt(Wt
i) to freely vary. We assume that if kt
















i)) are computed by employing the criterion (calculating the statistics) < over
all possible conﬁgurations where only the strategies of agents outside V
t
i are allowed to
assume all possible values.
We will suppose throughout that agents employ one out of the following four criteria to
evaluate such payoﬀs: (i) < = MAX; (ii) < = MIN; (iii) < = MEAN;( i v )< = RND.
In this last case, agent i computes her payoﬀ by picking at random one out of all available
payoﬀs.
The model is completely deﬁned once one has described the processes governing indi-
vidual strategy and network updating. Suppose at time t =0 , a strategy conﬁguration
18Ω0 ∈ {−1,+1}N and a graph G0 over I are randomly drawn. We assume that in any time
period t ≥ 1, ﬁrst, agents update networks (given Ωt); second, agents update strategies
given the new (just updated) graph. More speciﬁcally, given (Ωt,G t), any two agents (say
















If i and j are not connected (ij / ∈ Gt)t h e nd e ﬁne e V t
i = V
t
i ∪ {j} and e V t
j = V
t
j ∪ {i}. On
the contrary, if i and j are already connected (ij ∈ Gt)t h e nd e ﬁne e V t
i = V
t




















We suppose that agents decide (bilaterally) whether to add (or delete) the link by simply
comparing current payoﬀs before and after the proposed change and picking the network
associated to the largest one (i.e. deterministic, myopic, best-reply). We consider two
alternative tie-braking rules:
1. Accept the change if and only if both agents are strictly better oﬀ under the change,
i.e. add (or delete) ij if and only if e wt
i >w t
i and e wt
j >w t
j (we call this rule tie-break
without neutrality);
2. Accept the change if and only if no agent is strictly worse oﬀ under the change, i.e.
add (or delete) ij if and only if e wt
i ≥ wt
i and e wt
j ≥ wt
j (we call this rule tie-break with
neutrality).




    
    
Gt+1 = Gt ∪ {ij} if the link has been added
Gt+1 = Gt − {ij} if the link has been deleted
Gt+1 = Gt otherwise
.
After network updating, strategy updating takes place given Gt+1. W ea s s u m et h a t
an agent (say i) is drawn at random from I. Given (st






i )), she will switch to −st











(i.e. neutral updates are not accepted).
Let us turn now to provide some preliminary results about the long-run behavior of the
process governing the evolution of the pair {Ωt,G t} - and of some statistics thereof.
4 Simulating the System: Some Preliminary Results
In this section we present some results which can be obtained by simulating our model.
Unless otherwise speciﬁed, all results refer to Montecarlo averages across 50 independent
simulations characterized by the same parameters (i.e. the random values in the payoﬀ ma-
trix) but diﬀerent initial states for the agents in the population (actions and networks). In
each repetition we generate a population containing 15 agents, each using an independently
drawn payoﬀ matrix containing 215 entries, uniformly distributed in the [0,1]i n t e r v a l ,f o r
a total of 215 ×15 random values. As mentioned, such payoﬀ matrices are kept unchanged
across all repetitions of the same simulation. Nevertheless, given distributional assump-
tions on (and the huge number of) payoﬀ values, our results do not qualitatively change if
one employs diﬀerent payoﬀ landscapes across independent sets of simulations.
We ﬁrst discuss population dynamics in static networks (i.e. where agents can only
20update their action). Second, we will allow for local, endogenous, changes in the network
architecture and we will present results when agents are assumed to use diﬀerent statistics
in order to evaluate their payoﬀ.
4.1 Static networks
In order to appreciate how the connectivity of the network inﬂuences agents’ payoﬀsw e
ﬁrst run a set of simulations in which agents can only modify their strategies but not
their links. We generated 100 random network structures in which networks are initialized
(and then kept ﬁxed throughout the rest of the simulation). We let the probability that,
taken two agents, a link is established between them to range from 0.01 (almost totally
unconnected network) to 1.00 (fully connected one). For each population we perform 10
repetitions with the same network structure and payoﬀs matrices and randomly varying
agents starting actions.
Simulations show that, if the average number of links is suﬃciently large, then no
steady-state is ever reached and all populations continue to explore the payoﬀ landscape.
Figure 1 summarizes the main results when MEAN evaluation statistics is employed. The
ﬁgure plots long-run payoﬀs against long-run number of links for all the agents from the
100 populations. The expected value of payoﬀ is always 0.5, but the variance increases
with the number of links. Agents with no or few links have always payoﬀsv e r yc l o s et o
0.5, because this value is computed as the average over a large number of random values.
As the number of links increases, payoﬀs become more and more scattered on the entire
support [0,1], because the MEAN statistics is computed on smaller and smaller sets of
uniformly distributed random values.
The exercises using MIN and MAX payoﬀ rules produce similar results, with the con-
centration of payoﬀ for unconnected agents concentrated around 0 and 1 for minimum and
maximum respectively. In turn, simulations with RND payoﬀ rule exhibit a payoﬀss p r e a d
over all the range [0,1], independently on the number of links.
21Besides the absolute values of payoﬀs, the number of links an agent holds also aﬀect
how many updates improving the (population) average payoﬀ are performed. In fact,
when agents with fewer links switch strategy, they aﬀect only the few agents they are
connected to. Strategy changes have therefore little impact on the population average
payoﬀ. Conversely, populations of highly connected agents have highly volatile average
payoﬀs, because any strategy mutation modiﬁes the payoﬀ of many agents. In Figure
2 we report the phase diagram for the population average payoﬀ when agents are fully
connected14. The graph plots the population average payoﬀ at time t +1as a function
of the same variable at time t. Since we are assuming agents who are change-averse with
respect to action-updating, points on the diagonal indicate all cases in which no strategy
switch has taken place. When instead a switch has happened (oﬀ-diagonal), the distribution
of points shows no statistically signiﬁcant, diﬀerent from zero, correlation.
The MIN and MAX evaluation statistics show similar patterns. Of course here the
expected payoﬀ distribution for agents holding few links will be concentrated around 0
(MIN) or around 1 (MAX), as Figures 3 and 4 show. Therefore, when static networks
are assumed, the long-run relationship between the distribution of individual payoﬀsa n d
number of links held by the agents is driven (for any payoﬀ rule) by the trade-oﬀ between
average and spread induced by the chosen criterion.
4.2 Dynamic networks
4.2.1 MEAN and RND evaluation rules
We now move to the analysis of the full-ﬂedged model and allow agents to adaptively
change not only their strategies but also the set of neighbors with whom they interact
by adding and deleting connections. We start again by considering the MEAN evaluation
statistics and we initialize our simulations with totally unconnected networks and random
initial strategies.
14Again, the graph refers to a simulation with MEAN payoﬀ rule, although practically the same result
is obtained also for any other type of payoﬀ rule
22In this case we ﬁnd that, irrespective of whether neutrality is assumed or not,t h e
system displays multiplicity of steady-states. As we can see in Figure 5, all populations
display a similar dynamic pattern characterized by distinct phases (though the duration
of these phases may vary). At the outset, all agents in the population produce successful
updating both on strategies and on graphs, by exploring diﬀerent strategies and networking
structures. Second, they stop updating their strategies (i.e. strategy switches stop to
provide any improvement), but they continue to make some network modiﬁcation, adding
or removing links. Finally, also network updating stops, with the agents making no further
modiﬁcations. It is important to notice that payoﬀs and number of links for the 15a g e n t s
in the steady-state conﬁguration widely diﬀer within and across simulations. A typical
results shows that the number of links can range from 2 to 14 and payoﬀsf r o m0 . 1 to 0.98.
Population averages range between 7.7 to 12.1 for the number links, and between 0.48 to
0.69 for payoﬀs (cf. Figure 5). Since these heterogeneous stable points reached by our
populations diﬀer from one another, the system will displays many ‘local optima” which
create lock-in points for updating rules.
In Figure 6 we report the scatter plot of agents’ payoﬀs as a function of the number of
their links. As compared to the ‘frozen networks’ case (see Figure 1), endogenous network
updating allows agents with wider neighborhood sets to reach persistently higher payoﬀs:
here agents adapt so to concentrate on the higher portion of the payoﬀ space.
Notice also that these results are not aﬀected by the initial settings (e.g. fully connected
networks). The dynamic behavior of a system based on a RND evaluation rule is instead
quite similar to that displayed by static networks. Indeed, a RND rule fails to exhibit
a positive relationship between number of links and average payoﬀs. Moreover, strategy
and network updating continue indeﬁnitely and a stable structure is never achieved. This
result is consistent with the observation we made when analyzing static networks: agents
who employ this payoﬀ evaluation rule have no reason to prefer few to many links, since
the payoﬀ is always picked randomly.
234.2.2 MIN evaluation rule
A richer set of results can be obtained when one introduces the hypothesis that agents
use the MIN payoﬀ evaluation rule, i.e. they compute their payoﬀ as the minimum of
the values in their payoﬀ matrix corresponding to the strategies used by the agents with
whom there is no direct interaction. We can consider this payoﬀ rule as the one played by
“pessimistic” agents, in that they try to maximize the payoﬀ in the worst possible case,
considering these as the unobservable strategies (from the non-linked agents).
Contrary to the previous cases, here results heavily depend upon acceptance of neutral
network updating (i.e. whether agents add or remove a link although their payoﬀ remains
unchanged). In fact, increasing or decreasing the number of links held by an agent re-
spectively narrows or widens the set of payoﬀs from which the minimum is taken. Quite
often, it may indeed happen that adding or deleting one more links of an agent does not
modify the minimum value of such a set. Therefore these network changes are “neutral”
with respect to the payoﬀ evaluation. Whether such neutral changes are acceptable or not
is thus of a paramount importance to the dynamic of the network structure.
Let us begin by examining the case in which a payoﬀ-neutral network updating is always
accepted (i.e. agents are change-lovers). Figures 7 and 8 present respectively the time
series of the average number of links for the 50 simulated populations and the plot of the
average payoﬀ against the number of links. In this case, irrespective of the connectedness
of the initial graph, network structure and strategy choices never converge to a steady-state
and the long-run population average number of links ﬂuctuates around very high values
(between about 11 and 14). Furthermore, some positive correlation between average payoﬀs
and average number of links (although weak) still emerges (see Figure 8). If on the contrary
agents do not accept neutral network updating (i.e. they are change-adverse), we observe
convergence to multiple network steady-states, but strategies and payoﬀs never settle.
To see why this happens, notice that while a link between any two agents can never be
deleted (as such an operation cannot increase the minimum payoﬀ)15, new links can always
15This is obviously the case because, if an agent removes a link, the pool of payoﬀsa c r o s sw h i c ht h e
24be formed. Thus, the network becomes quickly highly connected and almost all agents
maintain a number of links close to 14 (cf. Figures 7 and 9 for an illustration). When
agents accept neutral updates, further changes in the network structure are very likely,
but this in turn heavily changes individual payoﬀs. Therefore, the system never climbs
a local optimum. Conversely, if agents are change-adverse as far as network updating is
concerned, they typically get stuck in one of the many local maxima. Strategy updating
instead never stops, because changes of an agent’s strategy induces considerable changes in
the other agents’ payoﬀs, and in general oﬀers opportunities for some of them to change,
in turn, their strategy.
In some sense, our result could be easily interpreted by saying that “pessimistic” agents,
who base actions on worst-case considerations, tend to increase more and more their “span
of control” in order to reduce the risk of unexpected worst cases. However, this behavior
collectively generates a very unstable environment, especially when payoﬀ-neutral network
updating is always accepted (i.e. when players can explore a larger portion of the payoﬀ
landscape).
4.2.3 MAX evaluation rule
When using the MAX payoﬀ evaluation criterion, agents adopt a sort of “optimistic”
criterion, as they base their decisions upon the best payoﬀs which could derive from the
behavior of unobservable agents (i.e. those outside their own neighborhood). Alike the
MIN criterion, also in this case results depend upon whether neutral network updating is
accepted or not.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case in which it is accepted. Here agents tend to develop net-
works with very few connections, because adding a link can never (strictly) increase the
maximum payoﬀ16. On the contrary, link deletion might increase the maximum payoﬀ and
minimum is computed becomes strictly larger than (and includes) the payoﬀ set associated to the network
with that link still in place.
16The new payoﬀ is computed as the maximum of a set which is strictly contained in the one associated
to the network containing that link. Thus, only if the maximum is still contained in the subset can the
link addition be accepted under neutrality.
25therefore be accepted. As the population tends to produce scarcely connected networks,
agents can tune their actions in order to reach the globally optimum payoﬀ.F i g u r e 10
reports the average payoﬀ for the 50 populations and shows that each population always
converges to the same highest payoﬀ (very close to 1). Furthermore, if one disaggregates
average payoﬀ in each population, it is interesting to notice that all populations converge
(for the same payoﬀ matrix) to the same strategy proﬁle and the same (maximum) individ-
ual payoﬀs, from any initial condition. Once the optimal strategy proﬁle has been reached,
some payoﬀ neutral network changes are still possible and therefore the network structure
never stabilizes. Notice, however, that all network structure over which the population
keeps cycling indeﬁnitely are payoﬀ equivalent.
If instead we do not allow agents to make strategy or network changes unless they
imply a strictly higher payoﬀ (non neutrality), we observe rather diﬀerent results. First,
and trivially, if we begin with an unconnected network, no link is ever established as none of
them can be strictly payoﬀ-increasing. If instead we begin with a fully or highly connected
network, not accepting payoﬀ neutral changes implies that agents may not climb the entire
payoﬀ landscape and may end up locked into local optima. The deletion of a link in fact
requires that both agents are strictly better oﬀ after deletion: if one of them is indiﬀerent,
the link cannot be removed and the other agent may be locked into a suboptimal set of
neighbors. Figure 11 plots the average payoﬀs for the 50 populations given the same payoﬀ
matrix. It can be noticed that populations lock into diﬀerent local optima depending on
the initial conditions17. Therefore, allowing for payoﬀ neutral network changes implies the
emergence of many steady-states (in both networks and actions) characterized by few links
and diﬀerent levels of average payoﬀ.
17Average payoﬀs are anyway very high because the MAX rule is used.
265C o n c l u s i o n s
Population learning in dynamic economies has been traditionally studied in over-simpliﬁed
settings where all agents play the same bilateral stage-game against any opponent and
stage-game payoﬀsr e ﬂect very simple strategic situations (e.g. coordination). In this paper,
we have addressed a preliminary investigation of dynamic population games over ‘rugged’
landscapes, where agents face a strong uncertainty about expected payoﬀs from bilateral
interactions. We have proposed a very simple model where payoﬀ landscapes are modeled
through ‘random population games’ and the population adapts (over both strategies and
network structures) using deterministic, myopic, best reply rules. The key assumption of
the model concerns how agents evaluate payoﬀs associated to networks which imply “local”
interactions. We have explored settings where players use very simple statistics (such as
MIN, MAX and MEAN) which are computed on the distributions of payoﬀs associated to all
possible action combinations performed by agents outside the interaction set. Preliminary
computer simulations have shown that: (i) allowing for endogenous networks implies higher
average payoﬀ as compared to “frozen” networks; (ii) the statistics employed to evaluate
payoﬀss t r o n g l ya ﬀect the eﬃciency of the system, i.e. convergence to a unique (multiple)
steady-state(s) or not; (iii) for some class of statistics (e.g. MIN or MAX), the likelihood
of eﬃcient population learning strongly depends on whether agents are change-averse or
not in discriminating between options delivering the same expected payoﬀ.
Given the preliminary nature of this study, many issues remain to be explored. First,
one needs a more careful investigation of the robustness of our results with respect to
larger population sizes (N). In fact, increasing N might have non-trivial eﬀects on long-
run system behavior because - for any given evaluation rule - the trade-oﬀ between average
and spread (or variance) of payoﬀ distribution may be heavily aﬀected.
Second, alternative strategy/network updating processes may be introduced. For exam-
ple, the introduction of idiosyncratic (low-probability) ﬂips in strategy updating (or more
generally of stochastic best-reply rules such as log-linear rules) may allow agents to better
27explore the environment and avoid lock-ins. Moreover, network updating schemes which
do not require mutual consent (i.e. unilateral link addition-deletion) might be employed.
Along, the same lines, one may think to introduce some concepts of ‘power’ or ‘hierarchy’
in order to study systems where some agents can place a veto on payoﬀ-decreasing changes
within their network.
Third, one might study the eﬀects of introducing (across-agent) heterogeneous, time-
varying and/or endogenously changing evaluation rules. For instance: What if we split
the population in two subsets, one using MIN and the other MAX throughout the entire
process? What happens when one introduces exogenous mutation in criteria? And, sim-
ilarly: Which is the eﬀect of allowing for endogenously changing (e.g. imitation-driven)
evaluation rules?
Finally, the model seems well suited to address the issue of social eﬃciency of diﬀerent
network structures in complex (random) environments populated by adaptive agents. In a
perspective quite similar to Jackson (2003), alternative eﬃciency criteria may be studied
against diﬀerent strategy/network updating schemes. Likewise, a social planner approach
might be conceived in order to address optimal network structure analyses.
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Figure 1: Fixed Networks with players employing the MEAN evaluation rule.
Scatter-plot of individual payoﬀs (y-axis) vs. individual number of links (x-axis) in the
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Figure 2: Fixed Networks with players employing MEAN evaluation rules. Scatter-plot of
population average payoﬀsa tt i m et + 1 (y-axis) vs. population average payoﬀsa tt i m et
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Figure 3: Fixed Networks with players employing MIN evaluation rules. Scatter-plot of
individual payoﬀs (y-axis) vs. individual number of links (x-axis) in the long-run (across
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Figure 4: Fixed Networks with players employing MAX evaluation rules. Scatter-plot of
individual payoﬀs (y-axis) vs. individual number of links (x-axis) in the long-run (across
50 populations of 15 agents).






Figure 5: Endogenous Networks with players employing MEAN evaluation rules.
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Figure 6: Endogenous Networks with players employing MEAN evaluation rules.
Scatter-plot of individual payoﬀs (y-axis) vs. individual number of links (x-axis) in the
long-run (across 50 populations of 15a g e n t s ) .






Figure 7: Endogenous Networks with players employing MIN evaluation rules and
accepting payoﬀ-neutral network changes. Evolution over time of population average
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Figure 8: Endogenous Networks with players employing MIN evaluation rules and
accepting payoﬀ-neutral network changes. Scatter plot of average payoﬀ (y-axis) as a
function of the average number of links (x-axis) in the long-run (across 50 populations of
15 agents).






Figure 9: Endogenous Networks with players employing MIN evaluation rules but NOT
accepting payoﬀ-neutral network changes. Evolution over time of population average
number of links across 50 populations with 15a g e n t se a c h .






Figure 10: Endogenous Networks with players employing MAX evaluation rules and
accepting payoﬀ-neutral network changes. Evolution over time of population average
payoﬀs across 50 populations with 15 agents each.






Figure 11: Endogenous Networks with players employing MAX evaluation rules but NOT
accepting payoﬀ-neutral network changes. Evolution over time of population average
payoﬀs across 50 populations with 15 agents each (zoom on few time steps) .
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